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I. INTRODUCTION
Class gift terms are regularly used to define the beneficiaries of wills
and trusts. Class terminology is particularly important in future interest
provisions as a means of referring flexibly to the children, more remote de-
scendants, or other relatives of transferors and others. These class gifts,
however, continue to present constructional problems and thus to involve
matters of concern to practicing lawyers, judges, and legislatures.
The terms most frequently encountered are those referring to some or
all of someone's issue, such as "children," "grandchildren," "descendants,"
and, of course, "issue." This Article examines the nature, variety, and, sum-
* This article is an adaptation of the author's 1982 Mortimer H. Hess
Memorial Lecture for the Bar of the City of New York.
** Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
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marily, the current handling of questions presented by these class gift
terms. It then attempts to offer suggestions concerning the drafting of will
and trust provisions and the development of legal rules to deal with these
questions.
The obvious goals of both law improvement and attentive drafting are
to (a) simplify planning or perform it more effectively, (b) lessen contro-
versy, and (c) improve results in individual cases. Proper drafting seeks to
accomplish this by fulfilling specific, actual intentions of individual clients
with ease and certainty. When an instrument fails to prescribe a clear solu-
tion to a constructional issue, and when the process of interpretation fails to
discover an actual intent (often because none existed), statutory or judicial
rules of construction take over. The role of these rules is to supply a legally
attributed "intent" through a presumption that can do no more, but should
do no less, than realistically reflect probabilities of intention and social poli-
cies relevant to the type of constructional situation at hand.2
II. CLASS DEFINITION: WHAT INDIVIDUALS AND RELATIONSHIPS
ARE INCLUDED?
A variety of recurring definitional problems arise in connection with
class gifts and essentially ask: What persons are encompassed by a class gift
term that refers to all or some limited category of the designated person's
descendants?
One general category of such cases is that in which a claimant con-
tends that, contrary to strict definitions, a particular transferor's reference
to "children" includes grandchildren, or that "grandchildren" includes
great-grandchildren or other descendants, or that "issue" means only chil-
dren. An examination of case results clearly indicates that, despite their
usual reluctance to do so, courts can and occasionally do give class terms an
interpretation that is broader or narrower than the words' literal meaning.3
Aside from revealing the possibility that such flexibility of interpretation
1. Except as necessary to the objectives mentioned in the next sentence in the
text, this Article does not undertake a detailed examination of doctrine in the nu-
merous problem areas discussed. Extensive treatments of most of these matters are
available elsewhere (and cited in footnotes hereafter); where this is not so, an at-
tempt is made here to explore, or at least open up, neglected aspects of the problem
areas. A source that makes a brief treatment possible for most questions is L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1977), with
extensive pocket parts by William Fratcher, to whom this issue is dedicated. Profes-
sor Fratcher also made significant contributions as a Reporter to the Uniform Pro-
bate Code, which is cited throughout this Article.
2. For a generalized analysis of the ingredients of sound rules and the role of
precedent in this area of law, and also a clue to biases that may exist in the author's
treatment of the present topics, see Halbach, Stare Deisis and Rules of Construction in
Wils and Trusts, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 921 (1964).
3. See, e.g., 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 34.19
[Vol. 48
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exists, most of these cases are relatively unimportant as a matter of either
litigation volume or legal principle. They represent merely individualized
use or misuse of terms. Some of these cases, however, may indirectly reflect
broader problems that are of more general interest for present purposes.4
The primary definitional problems of concern in this Article are those
that involve the rights of adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock.
In fact, controversies involving adoptees may well be the most frequent
source of litigation in the entire field of probate and trust law today, espe-
cially the future interest component of that field. Questions involving ille-
gitimate claimants also are becoming increasingly common and can be
expected to proliferate as we work our way through the implications and
uncertainties of recent United States Supreme Court decisions.5 Further
reason to expect these problems to increase can be found in recent statistical
data showing that at least one in every six American babies is now born out
of wedlock, with the percentage given up for adoption apparently
declining.
6
A. The Rights of Adopted Persons
In any comprehensive consideration of the rights of adopted persons to
take under class gifts, it is essential to recognize that adoptions occur in a
variety of significantly different circumstances and that issues concerning
the rights of adoptees and their descendants arise in diverse contexts. This
broad variety of potential problem situations requires awareness and atten-
tion, whether in private planning, in judicial reasoning, or in making and
articulating legislative policy. Too much of what is written in wills, trusts,
statutes, and court opinions is deficient because of an apparent failure to
have this diversity of application in mind. The result is that particular ver-
bal formulations intended to deal with problems in this area tend to be
inadequate to deal with problems in this area. If literally applied, they may
(children); 34.21 (grandchildren); 34.22 (issue); 34.23 (descendants) (1960 & Supp.
1982-1983). See also id §§ 34.9-.13 (heirs, next of kin).
4. See, e.g. ,In re Welles' Will, 9 N.Y.2d 277, 173 N.E.2d 876, 213 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1961) (discussed in text at notes 152-53 infra).
5. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding state statute precluding
illegitimate children inheriting from intestate father absent court order declaring
paternity); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (invalidating state statute pre-
cluding illegitimate children inheriting from intestate fathers absent acknowledge-
ment of child and marriage of parents).
6. A brief discussion of data from the National Center for Health Statistics
and interviews with personnel at the Urban Institute can be found in Babies Born Out
of Wedlock, Associated Press Wire Service, Oct. 26, 1981, reprinted in Washington
Post, Oct. 27, 1981, at 7, col. 1. Latest figures show that, although such births to
teenagers remain highest in sheer numbers, recent increases were greatest among
women aged 20 to 24, reflecting the results of both "living together" and women
wishing "to raise children [without] a long-term relationship with a man."
Parachini, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 5, 1983.
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even undermine the very objectives the writer probably would have had
with respect to situations other than the particular one or ones contem-
plated at the time.
As a preliminary matter, it is essential to distinguish the present subject
from the matter of intestate succession. Rules that may be appropriate for
intestacy may not be appropriate for interpreting class gifts or for incorpo-
ration into class definitions. This is especially true where future interests
are involved. Postponed distributions require transferor language or legal
rules that, in flexible and general terms, anticipate an array offuture adop-
tion possibilities that may involve persons and circumstances unknown to a
settlor or testator, and thus offer reasonably suitable solutions adaptable to
situations in which the transferor will have no opportunity to respond spe-
cifically. Furthermore, legal rules and drafting must deal not only with
persons adopted into a family but also with those persons born to family
members and thereafter adopted by persons outside the family, with sensitiv-
ity in either case to recurring variations in circumstances.
1. Adoption "In"
By far the most frequently encountered of the definitional questions is
whether class designations in private instruments should be construed to
include persons who claim membership in the class by virtue of adoption.
For example, in a devise to the testator's daughter, D, for life, remainder to
D's issue who survive her, does D's adopted child, or her adoptive
grandchildren if a child is dead, qualify as her issue for purpose of sharing
in the remainder?
A quick examination of the analogous area of intestate succession, fol-
lowing the introduction of adoption statutes in various states beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century, 7 suggests a gradual evolution of public atti-
tudes. This evolution was trailed by what might be characterized as fairly
widespread judicial foot-dragging whenever legislation was less than abso-
lutely clear on the rights of adoptees. A classic case of narrow construction
is a leading Florida case, In re Estate of Hewett,' which refused to allow
adoptees to inherit from the relatives of the adopting parents despite statu-
tory language declaring that an adopted child "shall be an heir at law and
for the purpose of inheritance shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of its
adopting parents."9 And, on the opposite side of the continent, it was not
until 1955 that legislative amendments made it inescapably clear to Califor-
7. See generally Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743 (1956). Adoption was not introduced in England until the Adoption of
Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29, but it has a long history in other legal
systems including Roman law. See Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 332, 333 (1922).
8. 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d 904 (1943).
9. Id at 142, 13 So. 2d at 907. Early attitudes are further suggested by Scha-
fer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304, 306 (1867) (adopted children "are not the children of the
[Vol. 48
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nia courts that adoptees are to take through as well as from their adoptive
parents. 1o
Because additional dangers are perceived to be present, there has been
a further lag in the recognition and development of adoptees' rights in the
construction of private instruments. The so-called "stranger to the adop-
tion" rule traditionally excluded, and frequently continues to exclude,
adopted persons from participating in gifts to the classes into which they
have been adopted, unless, in the language of the Restatement of Property,
"the conveyor is the designated person" whose children are in question or
unless "the conveyor at the time of the execution of the instrument...
[knew] of the adoption."" Despite sociological data and present-day intes-
tate succession policies reflecting a general acceptance of adoptees within
the broadly defined adoptive family,1 2 the stranger to the adoption doctrine
survives in many states today."3 Surprisingly few jurisdictions have enacted
specific legislation eliminating this rule of construction. 4
A simple example will illustrate the doctrine's application and the spe-
cial concern that has made courts and legislatures hesitant to change the
law to conform to policies implicit in their intestacy statutes. W's will be-
queaths her residuary estate in trust for her husband, H, for life, and pro-
vides that the remainder on H's death is to be "distributed by right of
representation to my then living descendants." W's daughter survives both
W and H and takes half of the remainder. W's son survives W but prede-
ceases H, leaving four children, three of whom were born to the son and his
wife and one of whom was adopted by them after W's death. In the ab-
sence of some special circumstances, the traditional stranger to the adoption
rule would bar W's adoptive grandchild from sharing in the remainder with
W's daughter and the three children born to W's son and daughter-in-
law.15
Some courts, recognizing that this result is likely to be contrary to what
W would have wanted, have strained case by case to find indications of
person by whom they have been adopted, and the Act of Assembly does not at-
tempt the impossibility of making them such").
10. See Ch. 1478, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stats. 2690 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE § 257
(West 1956)). See generallv tenBroek, California's Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 261 (1955).
11. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 287 (1940).
12. See, e.g., M. KORNITZER, CHILD ADOPTION IN THE MODERN WORLD 150
(1952); Kennedy, The Legal Effects of Adoption, 33 CAN. B. REV. 751, 874-75 (1955);
Thorson & Samuelson, A Comparison of Iowans'Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provi-
sions ofthe Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IowA L. REv. 1041, 1104 (1978). See
also New York Commission on Modernization, Simplification and Revision of the
Law of Estates, Report No. 1.3B, at 221-22 (1962).
13. See, e.g., L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, § 738.
14. Id
15. See Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifs, 50 IowA L.
REV. 971, 978-82 (1965).
1983]
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contrary intent in order to include the adopted grandchild., 6 This, to-
gether with an unpopular presumption, obviously serves to invite much of
the litigation on this subject.
Why, then, do these courts or the legislatures in these states not replace
outmoded constructional doctrine that they seemingly recognize to be con-
trary to the result the law ought to presume and to results now prescribed in
the analogous area of intestate succession? It is obviously not because of a
general belief that W would not want an adoptive grandchild to share in
the portion of her estate that would have gone to her son had he survived,
for there would be no reason on that ground to differentiate in general be-
tween testacy and intestacy. Instead, the answer apparently has to do with
a special fear, applicable to future interests but not to intestacy, that a rule
favoring adoptees will permit the deliberate use of adoptions-after a testa-
tor's death-to pass remainder interests to "outsiders" who have none of the
actual or de facto family relationships that the testator had in mind in pro-
viding for his or her or another's issue or children. In light of the breadth of
current adoption statutes, 17 and in light of occasional horror cases,", it is
understandable that judges, legislators, and draftsmen have felt some con-
cern about "conferring upon the designated parent [the] power, by adopt-
ing any person he may choose, in effect to appoint the subject matter of the
conveyance to such a person."' 9 An aspect of this concern is visible in the
history of early New York legislation, which, from 188720 to 1964, sought to
prevent "fraud" by adoptions "for the very purpose of cutting out a remain-
der" 2' that would otherwise go over to others.
In a number of jurisdictions, class gift legislation or judicial decisions
16. Id at 982-84. See, e.g., Holter v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 135 Mont.
27, 336 P.2d 701 (1959).
17. See, e.g., Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 435 N.Y.S.2d
527 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (involving parties to a homosexual relationship). See also Adop-
tion of Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982) (approving
adoption of 43-year-old by 32-year-old).
18. Possibly the all-time shocker is Bedinger v. Graybill's Estate, 302 S.W.2d
594 (Ky. 1957), in which a life beneficiary adopted his wife and thereby enabled her
to displace other claimants where the remainder was to the life beneficiary's "heirs
at law" under an intestacy statute that made adopted children heirs. More re-
cently, a 76-year-old widow adopted her 21-year-old neighbor, and the court found
that this defeated her uncles' executory interests which were conditioned on her
death without issue. Evans v. McCoy, 291 Md. 562, 436 A.2d 436 (1981).
19. 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY 358 (2d ed. 1968). See also
Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 580, 75 S.E.2d 632, 638 (1953); Oler, Construction
of Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are Concerned, 43 MICH. L. REV. 901, 938
(1945) (noting "the apprehension that if adoption were accorded the same legal
significance as lawful natural birth it might be employed for purposes of financial
gain or as a spite device").
20. See Act of June 25, 1887, ch. 703, § 1, 1887 N.Y. Laws 909, 909.
21. In re Walter's Estate, 270 N.Y. 201, 206, 200 N.E. 786, 788 (1936).
[Vol. 48
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(often influenced by local intestate succession policies) have overcome these
concerns and have granted adoptees recognition as class members for pur-
poses of will and trust dispositions.22 Where this progress has been
achieved, the result should not turn on differences in boilerplate or on prob-
ably fortuitous choice of language (e.g., "heirs of the body" or "children
born" to someone) in the absence of evidence that the transferor had the
question of adoption consciously in mind.23 On the other hand, most of
these rules reflect no particular concern for the special risks presented by the
possibility of adoptions following the transferor's death.2 4 Some statutes
and decisions do, however, attempt to reconcile the competing interests in
this area, and a few do so quite effectively.
A leading 1964 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, In re Estate
of Coe,25 recognized that, although the policies of the state's adoption stat-
ute "speak only of intestacy," these policies should "be accepted as a reflec-
tion of a common expectation and. . . as a guide to proper interpretation
of a gift." 26 The opinion added: "We cannot believe it probable that stran-
gers to the adoption would differentiate between the natural child and the
adopted child of another. . . [but more likely would] accept the relation-
ship established by the parent whether the bond be natural or by adop-
tion." The fear that fraud is invited "by permitting a person to adopt
someone solely to enable him to take under the will of another. . . can be
dealt with upon equitable principles if the circumstances are truly compel-
ling."2 7  In fact, subsequent New Jersey decisions, including a 1977
Supreme Court decision in In re Estate of Nicol,2 8 have excluded adult
adoptees from the particular future interest class gifts in controversy on the
22. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.10 (McKinney 1981). See
also In re Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 518, 319 P.2d 637, 641 (1957) (public
policy of state to give adopted child same status as biological child); In re Trusts
Created by Will of Patrick, 259 Minn. 193, 196, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1960) (not
biological act but emotional and spiritual experience of living together creates fam-
ily). This presumption has now become established in Missouri. See Stifel v. Butch-
er, 487 S.W.2d 24, 39 (Mo. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.010(2), (16) (1978 & Supp.
1982). See also Comment, Eligibility of Adopted Children to Take by Intestate Descent and
Under Class Cits in Missouri, 34 Mo. L. REV. 68 (1969).
23. The Minnesota cases are particularly good in this respect; references like
those in the text have not steered courts astray when the language was not found to
have been used by one consciously thinking of adoption. See, e.g., In re Trusts Cre-
ated by Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 250 N.W.2d 163 (1977); see also Estate of Sykes,
477 Pa. 254, 383 A.2d 920 (1978). But there is reason for some concern about Mis-
souri in this respect. See, e.g., Stifel v. Butcher, 487 S.W.2d 24, 38-39 (Mo. 1972).
24. See, e.g. ,In re Estate of Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957) (adop-
tion of adult person and her children).
25. 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964).
26. Id at 490, 201 A.2d at 574.
27. Id at 492, 201 A.2d at 575-76.
28. 152 N.J. Super. 308, 377 A.2d 1201 (1977).
1983]
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basis of probable intent.29
Analogously, some statutes attempt to reconcile the objective of recog-
nizing adoptees as full family members with concern over certain abuses of
adoption. This is usually done by providing that, for purposes of construing
class gifts, only persons adopted during minority are to be treated as if they
were born to the adopting parents, unless the contrary is provided in the
instrument. 30 A more recent Oregon statute may represent a better re-
sponse to the problem than simply to distinguish between adult adoptions
and the adoption of minors. It provides that, absent contrary intention, an
adopted person is included in a class gift if adopted "as a minor or after
having been a member of the household of the adoptive parent while a
minor.
' 3 1
Statutes and will or trust provisions that allow adoptees to participate
in gifts to classes into which they have been adopted only if the adoption
occurred prior to a specified age offer reasonably good means of handling
this general type of adoption problem. The very virtues of simplicity and
certainty they possess, however, are a source of some undesirable rigidity.
Two examples, at opposite extremes of the spectrum, illustrate this defi-
ciency. First, such a prescription would exclude a child reared from infancy
by foster parents but for some reason not adopted by them until beyond the
stated age. New Jersey's flexible doctrine would readily admit such an
adopted person to class membership, as would the terms of the above-men-
tioned Oregon statute. Even that statute, however, shares the flaw of other
arbitrary age provisions in that it, for example, expressly allows a childless
individual to adopt the minor children of a best friend as a means of favor-
ing that friend, who is too old to qualify personally as an adopted class
member.32
2. Adoption "Out"
Most legislative and privately drawn solutions to construction ques-
tions involving adoptees also fail to deal with the second major category of
adoption situations: persons adopted out of the family. Problems quite dif-
ferent from those discussed above are presented by situations in which one
born or properly adopted into the particular class in question is later
adopted by another parent.
Situations of this type occasionally arise when orphaned children are
29. Id at 319, 377 A.2d at 1208. See aso In re Estate of Griswold, 140 N.J.
Super. 35, 63, 354 A.2d 717, 732-33 (1976) (life beneficiary with no issue adopted
second wife's adult child after settlor's death; adoptee not allowed to take remain-
der to life beneficiary's "children").
30. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d), (g)(2) (Burns Supp. 1983); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6114(4) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-16 (1981).
31. OR. REv. STAT. § 112.195 (1981).
32. Cf In re Estate of Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957) (adoption
of adult and her minor children).
[Vol. 48
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adopted by a sibling of one of the deceased natural parents. This presents
possibilities that range from a double share for the adoptees to having a
single share divided among all of the adoptor's biological and adoptive
children.
3 3
A more common case is illustrated by the following: H bequeaths in
trust for his wife W for life, remainder on her death "to my [H's] then living
issue, per stirpes." After the death of H but during the life of W, son S
either dies or becomes divorced from his wife; the former Mrs. S thereafter
remarries and her new husband, the stepfather, adopts the children who
had been born to S and Mrs. S.
34
Wills providing essentially that adoptees are to be treated "for all pur-
33. Most generously, the adoptees might be allowed to take in both the natural
and adoptive lines; least generously, they might take only in the adoptive line, shar-
ing one portion with the natural children of the adoptive family. In between, they
might take separately only in the natural line. A less neutral in-between result
might be directed by a transferor-to have the original portions of the two lines
aggregated and the total divided equally among all natural and adopted children of
the enlarged family, treating all members of the family unit alike.
34. Adoption after S's death should normally allow the adoptees to share in
class gifts as S's issue, at least if contact with S's family continues. See, e.g., In re
Bissell's Estate, 74 Misc. 2d 330, 342 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sur. Ct. 1973). But words in
statutes and documents may present problems. See text accompanying notes 35-36
infia. In the more widespread problem of adoption following divorce, the results of
an adoptee's claims of class membership on the natural (S's) side are understanda-
bly in conflict. Compare In re Tracy, 464 Pa. 300, 346 A.2d 750 (1975) (settlor re-
mained in contact with grandchild), andIn re Estate of Zastrow, 42 Wis. 2d 390, 166
N.W.2d 251 (1969) ("children of the body"), with Commerce Trust Co. v. Duden,
523 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975) (instrument executed after adoption), noted in
41 Mo. L. REV. 259 (1976), and First Nat'l Bank v. Schwerin, 54 Or. App. 460, 635
P.2d 388 (1981) (analogizing class gift situation to statutory intestacy rule preclud-
ing adoptee from inheriting through natural parent). Cf In re Estates of Donnelly,
81 Wash. 2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1973) (adoption by stepfather after natural fa-
ther's death; adoptee not permitted to inherit from intestate natural grandparent).
The Uniform Probate Code incorporates into its construction rules (§ 2-611) most
of its intestacy rules in these matters, including § 2-109(1) which provides that
"adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent" does not sever the "relation-
ship between the child and either natural parent" for purposes of inheritance
through, as well as by or from, a parent. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1) (1975)
(emphasis added). See id § 2-611.
Unlike the above situations, natural children given up for adoption in infancy
rarely pose problems; they normally would not take as class members in the natural
family. See In re Estate of Russell, 17 Cal. App. 3d 758, 95 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1971).
Special situations, such as ongoing contact with the natural family, could well jus-
tify a contrary result. Cf. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(4) (Purdon Supp. 1982-
1983) (adoptee may take from natural relative if family relationship maintained).
Unfortunately, the words of some statutes may create general doubt, even when
none should exist, about results following an infant adoption.
On construction of a father's bequest to his "children," see In re Estate of Dai-
19831
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poses of this will as if they had been naturally born to the adopting par-
ents," or statutes (including intestacy statutes, either used by analogy or
incorporated into statutory rules of construction) employing language of
similar import,35 might lead to quite unsatisfactory results in these adoption
out cases, at least if the language is applied literally. In the sibling adoption
situation above, the words might be taken as requiring the share of a single
child (the adoptor) to be divided among what began as two groups of
grandchildren, regardless of how a court on its own might have thought the
testator would react and regardless of whether the sibling's anticipation of
such a result might inhibit adoption in such a situation. In the stepfather
adoption case, a literal application would have the result of snatching the
original grandchildren in question right out of the class of remainder
beneficiaries.
36
One body of comprehensive legislation may offer the adoptees broad
protection in these types of construction situations.3 7 Again, however, the
statutory wording fails to reflect the diversity of the situations to be consid-
ered, including the common situation of a non-marital infant surrendered
by a teenage mother for adoption at birth.3"
Thus, adoptions out of a particular family line as well as adoptions in,
with all of the varied forms and circumstances of each, must be considered
by anyone attempting to articulate comprehensive rules governing the
rights of adoptees. Initially, this challenge parallels the problems faced ear-
lier in connection with intestacy statutes, most of which have finally now
come to deal-explicitly if not always thoughtfully (especially on the natu-
ral side)-with questions of inheritance by, from, and through both the
adoptive parents and the natural parents. The challenges presented by con-
struction of class gifts, however, are aggravated by the necessity of dealing
with events that occur after a transferor's death, inasmuch as the trouble-
some class gift cases usually involve future interests under instruments exe-
cuted by transferors other than the adoptive or natural parents themselves.
Suggestions concerning the handling of these matters will be made after the
immediately ensuing material, which deals with other issues that should
gle, 642 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (children adopted by former wife's second
husband allowed to share with children of testator's second marriage).
35. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 257 (West 1956) (intestacy); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 29-1-6-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1983) (construction); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16 (1981)
(intestacy and construction).
36. See note 34 supra.
37. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 117 (McKinney 1977). Id § 117(1) terminates
an adoptee's inheritance rights "through his natural parents," but id § 117(2) pro-
vides that § 117(1) "shall not affect the right of any child" to take under a "will
... or. . . inter vivos instrument heretofore or hereafter executed by such natu-
ral parent or his or her kindred."
38. See, e.g., Accounting of Cook (In re Best's Will), 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct.
1982) (non-marital child adopted out as infant shares with later born marital child
as "issue" under natural grandparent's testamentary trust).
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also be covered in a comprehensive treatment of major definitional
problems.
B. Persons Born Out of Wedlock
Problems involving non-marital children, generally unadopted ones,
arise in contexts almost as varied as those involving adoptees. The law's
primary traditional line of distinction with respect to non-marital children
has been between relationships on the maternal side and those on the pater-
nal side, with the latter seeming to suggest the spectre of an illegitimate
offspring's surprise appearance at the natural father's funeral.
39
The most important litigation in this general area to date has involved
intestacy. The major modern decisions have significantly, but without clar-
ity, enhanced the child's rights on the paternal side, mainly through direct
and indirect stimulus of equal protection concepts under the federal consti-
tution. Most directly relevant are the United States Supreme Court's 1977
and 1978 decisions in Trimble v. Gordon,' striking down (5-4) an Illinois in-
testacy statute,4 ' and Lalli v. Lalh',42 upholding (5-4) the quite restrictive
1965 version 43 of a New York intestacy statute that has subsequently been
39. Or at a probate or trust proceeding. Surprise can even occur in the mater-
nal family if an adoption out in infancy does not sever the ties. Ser Accounting of
Cook (In re Best's Will), 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct. 1982).
40. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
41. The statute required not only acknowledgement by the father but also mar-
riage of the parents for the child to inherit from the father. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1973) (repealed 1976). Without holding legislative classifica-
tions based on illegitimacy strictly suspect, the Court required that they be substan-
tially related to permissible state interests. Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
rejected encouragement of legitimate family relationships as such an interest but
approved of the aim of maintaining an efficient and accurate intestate succession
system, conceding the existence of difficulties in proving paternity and dangers of
spurious claims. 430 U.S. at 769-72. The statute, however, excluded "significant
categories of illegitimate children" whose rights could be "recognized without jeop-
ardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles." Id at 771.
To be valid, it would have to be more "carefully tuned to alternative considera-
tions." Id at 772.
42. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
43. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1965) (amended
1979). The statute then allowed inheritance from the mother and her kindred, as
statutes traditionally have, but not from the father or his kindred unless a court
"has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation, declaring pater-
nity." Id. The state court had excluded evidence of the non-marital son's relation-
ship to and with the decedent, including the latter's notarized document consenting
to the marriage of "my son" and the affidavits of others stating that the decedent
had often and openly acknowledged the son. The Supreme Court upheld the stat-
ute as sufficiently related to the permissible purpose of "providing for the just and
orderly disposition of property at death," reducing the frequency of "fraudulent
assertions of paternity" and assuring fair opportunity to defend against "unjust ac-
19831
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liberalized.4 4
State courts, too, have played a role. One of the more interesting re-
cent cases is Lowellv. Kowalski,45 a 1980 Massachusetts decision which inval-
idated a statute allowing inheritance on the father's side only upon
adjudication of paternity during his life or upon the parents' marriage.46 It
is difficult to predict how influential this decision may be elsewhere or how
generally relevant it may be for present purposes because this case, too,
involved intestate succession and because the court's conclusion that the
sex-based classification was subject to strict scrutiny was based on the state's
Equal Rights Amendment.
Strikingly lacking in recent decisions is any recognition that a state's
interest in effectuating a decedent's probable intention is a permissible justi-
fication for state-drawn distinctions in this area.4 7 Earlier recognition of
that interest, however, may be found in a 1970 Minnesota decision, In re
Estate of Pakarinen.A Even with the present uncertainties in constitutional
doctrine, there should be no concern over the propriety of New York's post-
Lali, intent-related extensions of the non-marital child's inheritance right
to situations in which the father has duly executed and filed "an instrument
acknowledging paternity" (1979 amendment)4 9 or in which paternity is "es-
tablished by clear and convincing evidence and the father. . . has openly
and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own" (1981 amendment).5°
Other important legislation dealing with the intestate succession rights of
cusations in paternity claims." 439 U.S. at 268-71. The statute was the product of
a balanced study by individuals "experienced in the practical problems of estate
administration." Id at 269. Justice Blackmun's concurrence found the distinctions
between £alli and Timble unconvincing, id at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring), and
a four-justice dissent properly noted the irony that existed because probabilities of
intention would most likely favor the very non-maritals the New York statute ex-
cluded, the requirement of a court order making "it virtually impossible for ac-
knowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit intestate." Id at
278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra. It is possible that the liberaliza-
tion was in response to the irony pointed out in the Lalli dissent. See note 43 supra.
45. 380 Mass. 663, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980).
46. Id at 670, 405 N.E.2d at 141.
47. An argument that the Illinois intestacy statute could be justified as a reflec-
tion of probable intention was not considered in Timbe on procedural grounds, the
issue not having been raised and examined in the state court proceedings. For
whatever value it now has, a negative view about a presumed intent argument is
expressed in a footnote in Trimble. 430 U.S. at 775 n.16. Such an argument would
hardly have been relevant to the New York statute's provisions at the time of the
Lalli decision. See note 43 supra. See also note 52 infra.
48. 287 Minn. 330, 336-37, 178 N.W.2d 714, 717-18 (1970).
49. Gh. 139, § 1, 1979 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981)).
50. Gh. 75, §§ 1, 2, 1981 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST
LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981)).
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non-marital children has resulted from the adoption of, or has been based
on, the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Parentage Act.5"
Much less certainty, experimentation, and development is reflected in
decisions and legislation on the construction of class terminology, including
the constitutionality of statutory or judicially established presumptions of
intention, in private instruments.5 2 The Uniform Probate Code, however,
does contain a provision that class gifts and other terms of relationship be
construed "in accordance with rules for determining relationships for pur-
poses of intestate succession," except that "a person born out of wedlock is
not treated as the child of the father unless the person is openly and notori-
ously so treated by the father."5 3 Recent legislative trends in intestate suc-
cession may prove influential in the class gift area. Again, of course, it must
be remembered that the problems of construction differ and complexities
are accentuated because of the increased variety of situations involved, and
especially because future interests raise problems--often delayed
problems-about the offspring of others, not merely of the transferor.
The result of all this is to increase the importance of informed, sensitive
attention to these matters in private planning. It is not particularly difficult
for testators to deal clearly and as they wish with the possible rights of their
own illegitimate offspring, 54 at least to the extent the elements of surprise
51. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (1975); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4
(1973).
52. Potentially the most significant case in this area of construction held a stat-
utory presumption unconstitutional when the canon of construction flatly allowed,
absent contrary intent, a non-marital child to hold class membership through the
mother but not through the father. Estate of Dulles, 494 Pa. 180, 431 A.2d 208
(1981) (dealing with 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(5) (Purdon 1975) (amended
1978)). The case relied heavily on Tirnble and contains only a superficial note de-
nying that La//i might be more permissive. 494 Pa. at 190 n.5, 431 A.2d at 213 n.5.
The particular canon then before the Pennsylvania court would not have passed
even a more lenient test, but of more general significance is the opinion's strongly
negative general viewpoint (based on the Tmble footnote discussed in note 47
supra) concerning whether a permissible purpose could be based on trying to give
effect to a probable or typical, rather than a universal, intention of transferors.
Much of the non-constitutional case law and discussion available either focuses
on the wills of the parents themselves or reflects what may be earlier judicial assess-
ments of transferor intentions. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 286
(1940); 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY 358 (rev. ed. 1981). For four
common situations in which there is likely to be a finding of intent contrary to a
rule that would presumptively exclude illegitimates, see RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 286(2) comments d-h (1940). See also Comment, Rights of Illegitimate Children
in Missouri, 40 Mo. L. REV. 631, 649-50 (1975).
53. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-611 (1975).
54. The handling of this matter is not complicated by firm legal restrictions;
forced share protection (outside Louisiana) does not extend even to legitimate mi-
nor children. See, e.g., McKamey v. Watkins, 257 Ind. 195, 273 N.E.2d 542 (1971).
But there may be problems of client candor, or need for delicacy of expression,
1983]
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and pretermission are taken care of. The first of these elements is, of course,
not likely to be a problem in situations involving maternity, nor is it a prob-
lem in instances of paternity adjudicated during the father's lifetime. The
second is also not likely to be a source of difficulty as long as the state's
pretermitted heir statute, like most, at least under ordinary circumstances,5 5
protects only after-born children. But there are some examples of the start-
lingly strict application of statutes that protect pre-existing descendants,
and these may cause problems in various ways.5 6
Both in drafting and in judicial or legislative legal development, the
most significant challenge in the non-marital issue area has to do with what
might be called, by analogy to the troublesome adoption problems, "stran-
ger to the conception" situations. With respect to future interest provisions
and the treatment of non-marital descendants of a transferor's children or
others, it is important to remain alert to the diversity of illegitimacies and of
the situations to be considered. We should also be careful not to assume
that all illegitimates are family outsiders, even on the paternal side. Thus,
the common, seemingly casual injection of the word "lawful" into provi-
sions that express or define class gift terms is likely to be inadequate or even
counterproductive.57 This is because, in addition to situations involving
traditional images of disputed paternity or surprise presented by non-mari-
tal issue who are not likely to be a transferor's intended beneficiaries, plan-
ning must be sensitive to situations in which non-marital issue are likely to
be intended beneficiaries. That is, planning and drafting should take ac-
conceivably even in the maternal family. Cf Accounting of Cook (In re Best's
Will), 455 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sur. Ct. 1982) (while testatrix "may have been reluctant
to acknowledge" non-marital issue, exclusion "could easily have been accom-
plished" by a bequest "to 'issue of a lawful marriage' or similar language which
would not acknowledge or suggest that there was in fact a non-marital child").
Where the natural parent's will was unclear, a presumption that only legiti-
mates were included was found rebuttable by the "family circle" concept in In re
Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973).
55. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (1975) (protecting only afterborn chil-
dren or ones the testator "believes. . . to be dead"); Rees, American Wills Statutes,
46 VA. L. REV. 856, 892-97 (1960).
56. See, e.g., Estate of Gardner, 21 Cal. 3d 620, 580 P.2d 684, 147 Cal. Rptr.
184 (1978). In that same jurisdiction, an attempted concealment of an existing
child and some delicacy of wording may have been the source of the earlier diffi-
culty with the pretermitted heir statute in In re Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234,
352 P.2d 505, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1960).
57. Not only is this language often used routinely in will and trust boilerplate,
but it also appears in statutes. For example, Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.010(16) (Supp.
1982) still provides that "'[i]ssue' of a person . . . includes all lawful lineal de-
scendants." This was not changed at the time of an amendment in 1980 which
brought a "child born out of wedlock" within the definition of "child." See 1980
Mo. Laws 446, 449 (amending Mo. REV. STAT. § 472.010(2) (1978)). Also compare
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-3 (Burns Supp. 1983) (defining "child" generally) with id
§ 29-1-6-1(e) (defining "child" for purposes of construing wills).
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count of the future possibility and even the present existence of technically
illegitimate issue (e.g., a client's grandchildren) who are the product of de-
fective marriages or of deliberately non-formalized relationships of couples
living together, particularly in stable, long-term family arrangements."8 It
is one thing for a client to disapprove of a son's or daughter's lifestyle in the
latter of these situations and quite another to reject the grandchildren the
unsolemnized relationship brings into the family. Similarly, after a settlor
has died but before a trust remainder is distributed, there are quite varied
circumstances under which a child born out of wedlock in the settlor's fam-
ily might, without adoption, be raised and fully accepted as a member of
the broad family of descendants for whom the settlor has provided.59
One would hope, incidentally, that a few ounces of common sense
would keep this category of problems from expanding to include those chil-
dren born through the new (or old) biology to married couples with the
consent of both.6"
C. Suggestions for Handling These Problems
In drafting wills and trusts, and in many efforts to develop legislation
on the subject of non-marital issue, it may be constitutionally safer and
more in accord with the probable intentions of transferors to abolish or
diminish arbitrary sex-based distinctions between the maternal and pater-
nal lines, and other distinctions relying on formal establishment or declara-
tion of natural or adoptive parentage, in favor of heavier reliance upon
actual behavior patterns, parent-child treatment, and informal family rec-
ognition and acceptance. 6 This approach has the advantage of not sin-
gling out the child born out of wedlock, because these same guidelines also
58. For an illustrative provision calling for class terminology to include chil-
dren and issue of children "born to persons . . . after the performance of a mar-
riage ceremony between them," even if the marriage is invalid, see A. CASNER,
ESTATE PLANNING 291 (rev. ed. 1982).
59. See, e.g., In re Hoffman's Will, 53 A.D.2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976). Such
situations can range from cases of unplanned non-marital children reared by a nat-
ural parent (usually but not necessarily the mother), or by the parents or sibling of a
natural parent, to cases of children deliberately conceived by unmarried women
who wish to be mothers but not wives. See note 6 supra.
60. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973).
61. An unarticulated version of this idea may actually be an implicit part of
the underlying rationale for the traditional distinction, albeit clumsy and objection-
ably arbitrary (see the constitutional problem in Estate of Dulles, 494 Pa. 180, 431
A.2d 208 (1981)), that treats unadopted illegitimates differently on the maternal
and paternal sides. A "family circle" concept would seem preferable. See, e.g., In re
Trust of Parsons, 56 Wis. 2d 613, 203 N.W.2d 40 (1973). For adoption out situa-
tions, a Pennsylvania statute represents, even if too narrowly for most future interest
situations, a significant attempt to focus on actual family relationships; the provi-
sion excepts from the rule that an adoptee "shall not be considered. . . issue of his
natural parents" those situations involving interests in "the estate of a natural kin,
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appear more suitable than technical or arbitrary lines of distinction in deal-
ing with problems involving the rights of adoptees. Then, in formulating
legal or planning solutions in these constructional areas, it is essential to
keep in mind that the troublesome class gift situations, for which new and
better solutions are particularly needed, primarily involve instruments of
transfer by strangers to the adoption or conception, as the case may be.
Thus, wills and trusts might provide that class gift terms used in the
instrument include persons adopted into the class if the adopted person
lived for a significant period during minority as a member of the household
of the adoptive parent, and that such terms also include persons born into
the class out of wedlock if the person in question resided for a significant
period during minority as a member of the household of the natural parent
in question or the household of a parent or sibling of that natural parent.6 2
To deal with adoptions out, further provisions might direct something to
the effect that, if a class member (including a qualified adoptive or non-
marital class member) is later adopted by another person either within or
outside the family, that adoption is to be disregarded for purposes of the
instrument.63 In addition, it may be desirable to grant a disinterested
trustee or other neutral person reasonable discretionary authority to deter-
mine whether a person has lived for a "significant period" during minority
as a member of the household of an adoptive parent or natural relative, and
other than the natural parent, who has maintained a family relationship with the
adopted person." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(4) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
62. What might provide a sufficient basis, in policy and probable intent, for
allowing a child to share in a natural parent's own estate in the absence of an
indication of contrary intent might well be insufficient to provide the family bond
on the basis of which to imply that the child is to share in wealth transfers within
that natural family. Thus, mere acknowledgement, provision of support, and open
expressions of affection by the natural parent might well be insufficient for these
broader purposes without the more extensive commitment and family ties that
would normally follow from residing in a household within that family. Maybe
both clarification and differentiation of situations could improve the reference to a
father who "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child" in statutes like CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West Supp. 1983). See
aLro UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973). Compare the intestate succession rights of a
non-marital child if the father "openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as
his own" in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981). A com-
parable approach for construction purposes is provided in UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-611 (1975).
63. For adoptions out within the family, this provides neutrality for a possible
adoption decision, and it takes care of the problem, when adoption does occur, of
double shares or an overextended single share (the most and least generous extremes
described in note 33 supra). For adoption out by persons outside the family, this
result is analogous to but, this author believes, desirably broader than UNIF, PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-109 (1975), which provides that "adoption of a child by the spouse ofa
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in assessing significance to take account of the degree of de facto relation-
ships and acceptance established within the family.
Judicial opinions and even legislation might wisely consider an analo-
gous approach in the handling of constructional questions concerning the
rights of adopted and non-marital children, looking flexibly to the actual
relationships within the family circle. Unfortunately, in the latter area cur-
rent development must take place in an inhibiting atmosphere of constitu-
tional uncertainty. Obviously, the suggested flexibility is more familiar to
us as a normal aspect of the evolution of common law doctrine than it is as
a feature of legislation. Even in proceeding on an essentially case-by-case
basis through the courts, successful development of doctrine to some extent
assumes a proper start, which is best based on adequate awareness-even if
only in general terms-of the overall nature of the relevant concerns in this
fairly broad subject area.6 And if discretion is sometimes the better part of
valor, it is neither inappropriate nor unique65 for legislatures to set some-
what vague guidelines, like those suggested for private planning. These
guidelines would mainly point courts, or liberate them to move, in the right
direction. This is especially important if a fresh start or an adjustment of
-course is required in the particular jurisdiction.
The modest amount of indefiniteness that is a conscious element of this
recommended approach to privately defining or legally interpreting class
gift terminology is likely to have important advantages over the greater ap-
parent certainty of other approaches. This will especially be so when the
hard cases arise. In short, for the inevitable situations that cannot be specif-
ically contemplated, we are likely to be better off allowing common sense to
operate within somewhat vague but appropriate guidelines than to insist on
a specificity that may quite literally call for the wrong result.
6 6
Before concluding this discussion, it is appropriate at least to mention
two related matters to which some thought and attention should be given in
the future: the possible inclusion of some stepchildren and foster children in
classes that refer to someone's issue or children. Might it be worth consider-
ing legislation or will and trust provisions to open slightly, under limited
circumstances, the door that has generally been so tightly closed to these
64. In the adoption in area, a good example is the development of New Jersey
law from a proper start in In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964),
through the discretionary handling ofln re Estate of Nicol, 152 N.J. Super. 308, 377
A.2d 1201 (1977). See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
65. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.8 (West 1956) (deliberate vagueness in
dealing with so-called fraud on spouse's share problem) with UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§§ 2-201 to -207 (1975) (provisions set forth with great specificity).
66. Note, for example, the concern expressed throughout this Article over the
dangers of literal application of language to circumstances apparently not contem-
plated: in text accompanying notes 34-38 supra, dealing with adoption; in text ac-
companying notes 57-58 supra, dealing with illegitimates; in text accompanying
notes 90-91 supra, dealing with per capita/per stirpes problems; and in text accom-
panying notes 152-53 infia, dealing with a survivorship requirement.
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individuals? 67 Wide variations in the degree of attachment between the
immediate parties and within the broader family require caution, but
stepchildren or foster children might be treated as children and descendants
for class gift purposes if all of three types of requirements are met: an essen-
tially parent-child relationship beginning during the child's minority; a
continuation of the parties' close personal relationship to the date in ques-
tion or throughout their joint lifetimes; and a situation in which adoption
apparently did not occur because of a technical or legal obstacle rather
than intrinsic limitations in the personal relationship and commitments.
III. DISTRIBUTION AMONG ISSUE: PER CAPITA/PER
STIRPES PROBLEMS
A. Do Descendants Take in Per Capita or Per Stirpes Shares?
An early class gift doctrine in England presumed that issue-all of the
issue at the time of distribution-were to take per capita and not per stirpes
(i.e., not "by the stocks")."8 That English common law rule is occasionally
troublesome in this country even in modern times,69 and, as we shall see,
the strange history of these matters in New York is particularly colorful and
revealing.
Essentially, the strict per capita rule called for all living descendants,
regardless of degree or of competition with living ancestors, to take equal
shares of the fund to be distributed. Thus, a per capita distribution to A's
issue would be made in sixteen equal shares if A is then survived by two of
her three children, her eight grandchildren, and six great-grandchildren.
Where this antiquated rule applies, the transferor's more probable wish to
have distribution made per stirpes (i.e., one-third to each living child and
the other third to be divided among the deceased child's issue) would be
67. See generally 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, § 724. Exceptional cases
can be found based on peculiar dispositions or word usage. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Gehl v. Reingruber, 30 Wis. 2d 206, 159 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
68. See, e.g., Carrick v. Carrick, [1918] 2 Ch. 196; Davenport v. Hanbury, 30
Eng. Rep. 999 (Ch. 1796). It was suspected, as early as 1797, that "in applying
. . . [the rule] I am not acting according to the intention." Freeman v. Parsley, 30
Eng. Rep. 1085, 1086 (Ch. 1797).
69. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY-CALIFORNIA ANNOTATIONS § 303
(1940) (comment suggesting English common law rule may have been revived when
statutory per stirpes presumption was dropped as earlier statutes were allocated
between civil and probate codes). For illustration of a strange result, see Stickel v.
Douglass, 7 N.J. 274, 81 A.2d 362 (1951). Cf. In re Estate of Moses, 58 N.J. Super.
67, 155 A.2d 273 (1959) (future interest created before 1952 legislation still subject
to common law per capita presumption but presumption found rebutted). In Mer-
cantile Trust Co. v. Brown, 468 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1971), it was argued unsuccessfully
that the English rule controlled the meaning of a 1913 will. Now Cf Mo. REv.
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fulfilled only if that intention is expressed or if other evidence is sufficient to
overcome the per capita presumption.
The hallmarks of a patently unsound rule of construction are floods of
litigation, unpredictable results, and judicial declarations that the rule
"yields to a faint glimpse of contrary intention." This description is virtu-
ally a capsule summary of New York's experience under the per capita rule
through (and, to a more limited extent, after) the first two decades of this
century.70 At about that time a unanimous appellate division, too candid
to find anything "in the context of this will upon which to predicate an
intention to give to the word 'issue' any other meaning than that. . fixed
upon it" by New York precedents, 71 ordered the per capita rule applied to
the facts before it while pleading for the court of appeals to overrule its
prior decisions. 72 But then, in Peiy v. Langan 7' New York's highest court
simply affirmed the prior decision without opinion, leaving the correction of
prior judicial error to the legislature,74 which dutifully accepted the assign-
ment. Decedent Estate Law section 47a, now section 2-1.2 of the New York
Estates, Powers & Trusts Law, was enacted in 1921 and declared the per
stirpes presumption to be the law of New York.75
This prospective change in the law ironically has left the courts (as well
as many subsequent litigants) with the burdens of the flimsy old per capita
presumption. Until pre-1921 future interests are carried out, the earlier in-
struments will continue to cause litigation. 76 At the same time, the more
70. "Very faint glimpse" and "slight indication" language is found in most
cases to which the rule applies. See, e.g. ,In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 213 N.Y.
168, 174, 177, 107 N.E. 340, 342, 343 (1914). Earlier, the court of appeals in Soper
v. Brown, 136 N.Y. 244, 250-51, 32 N.E. 768, 770 (1892), had recognized that it
"might well be doubted whether a testator actually contemplated that the children
of a living parent would take an equal interest with the parent under the word
'issue,' or that the issue of a deceased child should not take by representation the
share of its parent." Some cases even refused to distribute per capita among chil-
dren and grandchildren when the instrument expressly called for distribution to
issue "equally" or "in equal portions." See, e.g., In re Durant's Will, 231 N.Y. 41,
131 N.E. 562 (1921); In re Union Trust Co., 170 A.D. 176, 156 N.Y.S. 32 (1915),
modified, 219 N.Y. 537, 114 N.E. 1048 (1916). In the Union Trust case, the court
stated that the per capita rule "has resulted in a distribution of estates. . . con-
trary to the testator's intention . . . [and in] great injustice among a testator's
descendants." 170 A.D. at 183, 156 N.Y.S. at 37.
71. Petry v. Petry, 186 A.D. 738, 740, 175 N.Y.S. 30, 31 (1919).
72. Id at 747, 175 N.Y.S. at 36-37.
73. 227 N.Y. 621, 125 N.E. 924 (1919).
74. Id at 621, 125 N.E. at 924.
75. Ch. 379, § 47a, 1921 N.Y. Laws 1189, stated that issue take "if in unequal
degree, per stirpes, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the will." See N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.2 (McKinney 1981).
76. The overwhelming majority find the required "faint glimpse" to overcome
the presumption, but the results are varied. Compare In re Good's Will, 304 N.Y.
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realistic per stirpes rule now peacefully governs post-1921 dispositions 7 7 _
except that human perversity has been able to provide divergent authority
on the question of whether the statutory rule for "issue" also applies to its
synonym "descendants.""8
Because of concern over continuing uncertainties and special problem
situations, forms and commentary generally recommend that the words "is-
sue" and "descendants" be accompanied by some reference to their taking
per stirpes or by right of representation. 79 As we shall see, however, even
these expressions are not wholly unambiguous, and further elaboration may
therefore be needed.80
B. What Does "Per Stirpes" or "Representation" Mean?
When it is expressly provided by instrument or law that issue are to
take per stirpes or by right of representation, there is no difficulty in deter-
mining the manner in which distribution is to be made under most circum-
stances. As long as at least one member of each generation of descendants is
living, there is no uncertainty about the generation that is to serve as the
"stock" generation-that is, in determining the level at which the process of
representation is to commence.8 ' As soon as one generation is wholly re-
110, 106 N.E.2d 36, 123 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1952), with City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Massimo, 88 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
77. Confusing additional language has required construction in a few cases.
See, e.g. ,In re Carpenter's Estate, 33 Misc. 2d 444, 224 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
78. The proper answer was obvious to the court and the per stirpes rule was
applied inIn re Schoellkopf, 21 Misc. 2d 564, 197 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sur. Ct. 1960), but
not inIn re Gardiner's Will, 20 Misc. 2d 772, 191 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sur. Ct. 1959). On
the excesses of narrow construction of statutes in derogation of common law, see
Pound, Common Law andLegislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 407 (1908) ("The public
cannot be relied upon permanently to tolerate judicial obstruction or nullification
of the social policies to which . . . it is ... committed.").
79. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING PRACTICE § 9.65 (Calif. Continuing
Education of Bar 1982) ("to my then-living descendants by right of representa-
tion"); D. WESTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING---DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 98 (2d
ed. 1982) ("issue who survive him or her, per stitrpes").
80. A. CASNER, supra note 58, at 293-95, directs that distribution per stirpes be
made by reference to the intestacy law of a selected state, with certain further speci-
fications. This approach is also taken for some forms in D. WESTFALL, supra note
79, at 58-59, 80-81. Care must be exercised in referring to a state's intestacy law.
The rules in a particular state may not prescribe what the client would want or they
may be unclear, especially when called upon to apply to a delayed distribution in
circumstances not common in intestate situations. See text accompanying notes 87-
89 inra.
81. For example, if A is survived by one child and two grandchildren who are
the children of A's deceased child, a distribution to A's issue per stirpes (or by repre-
sentation) clearly calls for the child to take half and the grandchildren to divide the
other half, one quarter each.
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moved, however, uncertainties arise.
A simple example will illustrate the issue in the latter situation. As-
sume that X left his residuary estate in trust until the death of the survivor
of his two children, S and D, with the remainder then to be distributed to
his (X's) issue. Assume further that the will or a local statute employs a
version of commonly used statutory language (here, a combination of two
New York provisions) stating that when property is to be distributed to
issue,
such issue, if in equal degree of consanguinity to their common
ancestor, take per capita; but if the issue are of unequal degree,
they take per stirpes, unless a contrary intention is expressed. A
distribution is per stirpes when it is made to persons who take as
issue, in equal portions, the share which their deceased ancestor
would have taken if living.
8 2
If X's three grandchildren (S's child and D's two children) were all alive
when the trust terminated, they would clearly take a third of the trust estate
apiece under this language."3 But let us instead assume that one of D's
children is then deceased with children living. Would the trust estate now
be distributed half to one grandchild (S's child), a quarter to the other
grandchild (D's living child), and a quarter to the children of the deceased
grandchild (i.e., the offspring of D's deceased child)? Or are there still three
primary shares, with the grandchildren serving as the stock generation and
only the great-grandchildren taking by right of representation?
The latter interpretation seems more appropriate to a scheme that ba-
sically calls for equal treatment of grandchildren when all children are
dead, as quite clearly the above wording does at the outset, and as seems
now to be the generally preferred pattern for intestate succession.8 4 Yet
that same interpretation applied to the rest of the above-quoted language
would treat it as if it directed (as literally it does not): (a) that the nearest
generation of living claimants (here, the grandchildren) take per capita not
only if all issue are of equal degree but even if they are not; and (b) that
only those more remote, instead of all issue, take by right of representation,
or by the stocks.
82. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw §§ 1-2.14, 2-1.2 (McKinney 1981)
(language quoted in text combines above provisions).
83. If the applicable language were less clear, one of the three grandchildren
(S's child) might take half and the others (D's two children) a quarter each, by
representation. This controversy has a long ancestry and sometimes inquires into
English interpretation of the Statute of Distribution, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 10,
and even Roman law concepts. Compare In re Ross's Trusts, 13 L.R.-Eq. 286 (1871),
with In re Martin's Estate, 96 Vt. 455, 120 A. 862 (1923).
84. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (1975); MODEL PROBATE CODE
§ 22 (1946). The point may be put too strongly, but in Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Lothrop, 276 Mass. 496, 500, 177 N.E. 675, 676 (1931), the court stated that "[p]er
capita distribution among issue of equal degree when there are no children . . .
expresses the natural impulse of mankind."
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An interesting pair of decisions struggled to different conclusions with
a couple of intestacy statutes, both of which read essentially like the combi-
nation of New York constructional provisions used in the foregoing exam-
ple. The often-cited Massachusetts case of Balch v. Stone85 adopted the
second result mentioned above, under which the grandchildren are the
stock generation and only the great-grandchildren take by right of represen-
tation." The court in the other leading case, California's Maud v.
Catherwood,87 felt compelled by a literal reading to accept the first interpre-
tation, under which, when all children are dead, even the living grandchil-
dren take by right of representation when some grandchildren are dead
leaving issue as of the time distribution is to be made.8 In Maud, the court
was forced to determine the intestacy statute's application to such a situa-
tion because it had been incorporated into the remainder provisions of an
inter vivos trust established by S. Clinton Hastings, once Chief Justice of
California, and subsequently the founder of the University of California's
Hastings College of Law in San Francisco. 8
9
In addition to the problem raised by the wording of the clause or stat-
ute in the above example, consider the effect of a simple, quite typical will
provision directing distribution to issue per stirpes or by right of representa-
tion and assume that the living issue consist solely of three grandchildren,
two by one deceased child and one by another. If the words are taken liter-
ally, this clause would direct that these grandchildren are to take per stir-
pes, even despite a modern statutory canon or judicially established
presumption (probably based on the typical modem intestacy rule) that
issue who are all of equal degree take per capita. Is representation of the
children by the grandchildren really what the particular client desired in
this situation? Is it desired by all clients of lawyers who routinely use such
language in their will and trust forms? Should the form, or at least an
alternative form," be designed to provide, in effect, that the nearest genera-
tion of living distributees is to be the stock generation, i.e., the first genera-
tion at which the fund is to be divided into equal shares, with
representation to take place thereafter? There are also other drafting and
legislative possibilities that might be considered. 91
85. 149 Mass. 39, 20 N.E. 322 (1889).
86. Id. at 42, 20 N.E. at 324. See also Healey v. Cole, 95 Me. 272, 49 A. 1065
(1901).
87. 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (1945), noted in 33 CALIF. L. REV. 324
(1945).
88. 67 Cal. App. 2d at 642, 155 P.2d at 114.
89. Where Professor Fratcher, to whom this issue is dedicated, taught as a visit-
ing professor during the fall semester, 1976.
90. See note 92 infra. See also note 80 and authorities cited therein supra.
91. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-15, -16 (1966); Waggoner, A Proposed Alter-
native to the Uniform Probate Codes Systemfor Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66
Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1971) (advocating system of "per capita at each generation").
See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 comment (1975).
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At least until these matters become generally settled in this country by
legislation or decision, prudent drafting would seem to require that instru-
ments contain a provision not only declaring that issue or descendants take
by representation or per stirpes, but also precisely defining whichever of
these latter terms one prefers to use. An elaborate and precise definition
that, with modest adaptation for the class gift situations, can serve as a
model is provided in the Uniform Probate Code. 2 It would probably be
adequate for instruments (or statutes) merely to provide, as some rather
abbreviated intestacy statutes do, that, unless otherwise provided, if issue
are of equal degree they take in equal shares, and if not then those more
remote take by right of representation.93 Probably the most appropriate
legislative or judicial solution for construction situations is that the shares of
issue are presumptively to follow the pattern of distribution to issue called
for by local laws of intestate succession.94 As we have seen, these tend in-
creasingly to look to the nearest generation of living claimants as the stock
generation and thus to favor equal treatment of grandchildren if all chil-
dren are deceased.
C. An Unexplored Problem.- Discretionay Trust Distributions to Issue
Assume that, pursuant to an increasingly common type of estate
plan,95 the will of client C is to establish a "bypass" or "credit shelter" trust
92. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-106 (1975). That definition is designed for intes-
tacy situations, but a flexible class gift adaptation might read:
Where issue or descendants are to take "by right of representation" or
"per stirpes," or where the manner of distribution to such a class is not
specified, the property is to be divided into as many equal shares as there
are then living members of the nearest degree of living descendants and
deceased members of that same degree who leave descendants then living;
and each living member of that degree shall receive one share, and the
share of each deceased member of that degree shall be divided among his
or her descendants in the same manner.
93. See MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22(b)(1) (1946). The same general wording
was later used in UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1) (1975).
94. Intestacy principles should serve at least as general policy guides to courts
in construction. See, e.g., Mercantile Trust Go. v. Brown, 468 S.W.2d 8, 13 (Mo.
1971). In many matters other than these share questions, however, it may be un-
wise for intestate succession policies to be slavishly followed in specific detail be-
cause of the different circumstances to be dealt with and the different considerations
that may be involved in construing private instruments (as we saw in adoption and
illegitimacy matters); but even so, the policies in both areas ought to be generally
harmonious.
95. The larger marital deduction often taken under the unlimited deduction
now allowed by I.R.C. § 2056 (Supp. V 1981) invites greater attention to the in-
come and estate tax concerns of the surviving spouse and his or her estate. Thus,
trusts for the non-marital share are frequently being designed so that income not
needed by the survivor will be withheld, either to be accumulated for future need
(especially in moderate sized estates) or, as in the facts in the text, to be sprinkled to
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of the non-marital deduction portion of her estate. Assume further that the
terms of the trust will authorize income that is not needed by her husband,
H, to be sprinkled among C's issue in the trustee's absolute discretion, This
flexibility seems advantageous for tax reasons because, although C's pri-
mary concern is for H and then for her two children, neither H nor the
children (S and D, who are now in their peak earning years) expect, ordina-
rily at least, to have actual need of funds from the trust. C then dies leaving
a will that is designed to carry out this general plan, and everyone's expec-
tations concerning the needs of H and the children prove so far to be right.
In the years that follow, the trustee thinks that, for income tax reasons,
the roughly $24,000 of annual trust income should go to the grandchildren,
all unemployed minors. H, S, and D seemed initially to agree that it would
be best that they not receive trust income and that it would be a wise use of
the trustee's discretion to avoid accumulations by distributing that income
to the grandchildren. S, however, thinks that his one and only child should
receive S's "share" of the income (i.e., half), while D thinks that her four
children and S's child should all receive equal portions (one-fifth each) of
the income.
As a result of this difference of view, S is beginning to have serious
doubts about passing up his share of the income although, of course, that
matter is not strictly up to him. Nevertheless, the trustee does consult with
the adult beneficiaries before making decisions about distributions, and S
thinks he could riake a strong case for receiving a portion of the income.
He also believes that, as long as he and D are alive and H has no need for
the income, C would have treated her two children or their families equally
and that the trust's design, induced as it was by lawyer-suggested tax plan-
ning, should be essentially neutral in its effect on the respective shares of his
family and D's. D's contrary view is that a scheme of equal distribution
among the grandchildren should be assumed as the normal pattern.
H rather inclines (as he thinks C would also) toward what he calls an
in-between position. He thinks that half should go, on a more or less per
stirpes basis, to each family in the absence of specific per capita needs or
motives, such as providing for current or future educational costs and the
like. He believes that the trustee should be able to readily identify and
justify these per capita needs on a case-by-case basis. H also suggests that
the way distribution is to be made following his death might be relevant,
and C's will essentially prescribes an equal division of the remainder, with
half going to 9 or her descendants and half to S or his descendants. H
admits, however, that he and C had not really talked about this with the
lawyer who drew their wills.
The trustee, feeling that any one of these positions would be reason-
able, is comforted only by the fact that this peaceful family is not (yet?) at




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/3
ISSUES ABOUT ISSUE
one another's throats-but he certainly wishes C's will had provided some
guidance.
C's lawyer probably wishes so also and may decide to talk to clients
about such matters in the future when this type of discretionary trust is to
be used. The lawyer also realizes that, if it is unlikely that the surviving
spouse will need payments from the trust estate, separate trusts for the chil-
dren, authorizing equal distributions from each trust to the spouse in the
event of need, might be a wise arrangement at the outset. This could offer
some additional tax advantages96 and some useful flexibility in tailoring
investments to the different circumstances and objectives of the various chil-
dren. But does this plan really do anything more than finesse the per cap-
ita/per stirpes issue by simply assuming the result?
A generally appropriate resolution of these issues is not readily appar-
ent,97 at least on the basis of present experience, but the hypothetical views
of S, D, and H may suggest some of the lines of argument to be considered
by lawyers if, as can be expected, they continue to create this type of trust,
or courts if lawyers continue to do so with little recognition of or attention
to these inherent difficulties.
IV. FLUCTUATING CLASS MEMBERSHIP
Class gifts present two basic categories of problems involving fluctua-
tions in class membership. Each type arises in an almost infinite variety of
dispositions and factual situations, especially when the class gift is in future
interest form. Again, the most urgent and common of these problems tend
to involve dispositions to the transferor's or someone else's children,
grandchildren, or other issue.
There are two questions that must be addressed. First, how long does a
class remain open to increase through the addition of new class members?
Despite the tension of apparently conflicting transferor objectives, the law
on this subject is fairly uniform throughout the states, as we shall see, and
experience suggests that the legal principles deal about as well as can be
expected with most of the cases. Nevertheless, on the private planning side,
greater awareness and imagination in drafting can handle the harder cases
and can do a better job of reconciling competing client objectives.
Second, does a future interest fail if the remainder beneficiary does not
survive until the time fixed for distribution, or does the future interest nev-
ertheless take effect so that the estate, or other successor in interest, of the
96. The separate entities will be especially helpful, despite the throwback rule
of the federal income tax, if there are to be substantial income accumulations, and
separate share treatment is useful in various ways, either through single or multiple
trusts. See generally E. HALBACH, supra note 95, at 155-57.
97. The natural inclination (see note 84 supra) to treat grandchildren equally is
initially tempting, but it may be that this is valid as a preference only when all
children are dead. Also, there is much to be said for the neutrality argument and
possibly for H's per stirpes notion with flexible exceptions.
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deceased remainder beneficiary receives the share the beneficiary would
have received if living? This type of issue appears to have been the most
frequent source of litigation in the entire field of will and trust construction
until the recent upsurge of litigation involving the rights of adoptees. Much
of the confusion and difficulty in the survivorship area can be eliminated by
a clear and surprisingly simple recognition of what is at stake and what has
really been going on in the cases, and by escaping from our own entangle-
ment in meaningless property law technicalities and jargon. Of course, here
too, alertness and improved drafting will help.
A. Maximum Class Membership and the "Rule of Convenience"
The question of how long class membership increases is confined to
cases in which the source or sources of class members may still be alive
when the class gift becomes distributable. Thus, X's outright bequest to his
own children does not pose a problem, nor does the trust he creates for L for
life, remainder to L's children. By contrast, the class closing issue is present
in A's bequests: to the children of her well-to-do son, who is still alive; of a
fund to be divided among her living sister's children who reach age twenty-
one; and of property in trust for A's husband for life, remainder "in equal
shares to my nieces and nephews," assuming A is survived by siblings. In
each of these cases the law quite reasonably infers that A had two logical
but sometimes conflicting objectives: (1) that A would wish to include all of
the children of her son or of her siblings, whenever born; and (2) that A
would like these grandchildren or nieces and nephews to receive their shares
of her estate as soon as possible.
The so-called "rule of convenience,"" if no contrary intent is ex-
pressed, closes the class as soon as any person whose rights are dependent on
the number of class members is ready to receive his or her share of the
probate or trust estate.9 9 Thus, the usual type of situation to which the rule
applies is one in which a fund is to be divided among the members of a
designated class; the closing occurs as soon as a member of that class is
entitled (disregarding administrative delays) to distribution." The rule
also can apply, however, for the convenience of other than class members.
98. This rule is sometimes referred to, especially in English cases, as the rule in
Andrews v. Partington, 3 Bro. 401, 29 Eng. Rep. 610 (P.C. 1791).
99. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 294, 295 & comments (1940).
An illustrative codification is found in CAL. PROB. CODE § 123 (West 1956), which
provides: "A testamentary disposition to a class includes every person answering
the description at the testator's death; but when the possession is postponed to a
future period, it includes all persons coming within the description before the time
to which possession is postponed."
100. In fact, it is often stated somewhat too narrowly that a class closes when
any member of the class is entitled to "immediate possession and enjoyment of his
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Thus, when each class member is entitled to a stated dollar amount, the
recipient of the residue is entitled to close the class when the testator dies or
when the prior trust interests terminate.' 0 '
Once the class closes, the rule excludes all class members who are
thereafter born (or, more properly, thereafter conceived or adopted);1"2 it
does not exclude potential takers who are already in being but who have
not yet qualified for their shares.' 0 3 Further elaboration and detailed ex-
amples can be found in various sources and are beyond the objectives of this
discussion.'
0 4
Some have noted ironically that the rule of convenience is hardly con-
venient to those who are excluded by it.'° 5 General experience and a review
of cases, however, suggest that the rule is relatively rarely called upon to
exclude an actual afterborn person; it usually applies merely to cut off the
possibility, often a faint possibility, of such class members.' 0 6 The rule thus
(1) InA's bequest (in the text) to her son's children, the class closes
at A 's death (apparently even excluding a child conceived during adminis-
tration of A's estate, as in Estate of Landwehr, 147 Pa. 121, 23 A. 348
(1892)).
(2) In A's bequest to her sister's children who reach age 21, the clos-
ing occurs as soon as a child reaches age 21.
(3) In the trust bequest for the husband's lifetime, with principal
then to go to A's nieces and nephews, the remainder class closes upon the
husband's death.
(4) If the remainder in the last example had been to such nieces and
nephews as reached age 25, the class would close at the later of the hus-
band's death or the attainment of age 25 by a niece or nephew.
Some uncertainty exists with respect to gifts of trust income shares to a potentially
growing class. Compare RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 295 comment i (1940) with
Applegate v. Brown, 344 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1961).
101. 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, § 648.
102. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 294 (1940). See also CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 123 (West 1956) (calling for inclusion of persons "conceived before but born af-
ter" the closing date); Fetters, The Determination of Maximum Membership in Class Gits
in Relation to Adopted Children, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1969).
103. For example, when distribution is to be made to children who reach age 21,
class closing upon the first child's attainment of age 21 excludes after-conceived
children but not living children who are still under age 21.
104. See authorities cited notes 99-102 supra; examples in note 100 supra.
105. See, e.g., the widely quoted Re Chartres, [1927] 1 Ch. 466, 471.
106. An illustrative and interesting case is Re Werhner's Settlement Trusts,
[1961] 1 All E.R. 184. The trust was for all "children of the settlor (whether now
living or hereafter to be born) as being male attain the age of twenty-one years or being
female attain that age or marry." Id at 186 (emphasis added). The settlor was age
38 when he created the trust and his three children were all minors. The action was
brought 29 years later when the children were either dead or adults and the settlor
was alive but had had no additional children since creating the trust. The court
ordered immediate termination and distribution (which was long overdue) to the
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permits timely distribution for the convenience of class members who might
otherwise have to wait decades for hypothetical siblings who never in fact
materialize. Of course, the law in this area might possibly be redesigned to
operate more flexibly. If so, it should begin by at least reconsidering its
traditionally irrebuttable presumption of lifelong fertility. 107 The present
rules, however, generally appear to function quite well and to operate
rather peacefully in this legal area.
0 8
In drafting the above-described dispositions of A's will, greater free-
dom of choice was available to A's lawyer than the law would exercise as a
matter of construction. This flexibility is particularly important whenever
there is a realistic possibility of afterbom class members for whom the client
would like to provide. For example, this would be the case if, at the time of
planningA's will, there appears to be a substantial likelihood of her brother
or sister having children after her death, as would be the case if A were to
die young or if a great age spread exists between A and one or more of her
siblings. In fact, a more flexible approach is especially likely to be of impor-
tance when A's will or trust is being drawn, for some reason (e.g., because of
the present wealth and tax position of a child), to leave all or part of A's
estate directly to or for the benefit of the offspring of a son or daughter who
is still in apparent child-bearing years.
The devices available in A's planning for these situations include
(a) the use of conservative, or possibly discretionary, partial distributions;
(b) expressly establishing a class-closing time based upon the source or the
class members themselves attaining a certain age; (c) establishing a class-
closing time based on the passage of a stated number of years following the
birth of the source's most recent child; or (d) using a combination of (a) and
living children and to the deceased child's estate, holding the rule applicable to
inter vivos as well as testamentary trusts and not finding the required clear and
unequivocal evidence of contrary intent in the above-quoted language (because it
was not to children "whenever born, notwithstanding the rule"). Id at 190.
107. The primary applications of this much-criticized doctrine are in rule
against perpetuities ("fertile octogenarian") and trust termination cases. See the
perpetuities classic, Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787); Leach, Perpetuities
in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938) (especially example 11); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 340 (1959) (especially comment e) (trust termi-
nation with consent of beneficiaries); 3 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 340.1 (2d
ed. 1956 & Supp. 1961) (especially text added by 1961 supplement).
108. Most of what modern case traffic there is either comes from England
(where a surprising amount of controversy is generated by real or alleged fine dis-
tinctions) or involves fringe issues. See, e.g., Applegate v. Brown, 168 Neb. 190, 95
N.W.2d 341 (1959) (potentially troublesome precedent involving class income inter-
ests, set possibly as a way of escaping the rule against perpetuities), noted in 44
MINN. L. REV. 1031 (1960). That case then governed the construction in Apple-
gate v. Brown, 344 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1961). Seegenerallv cases collected in 2 L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 1, §§ 634-651 (Supp. 1977); Annot., CAL. PROB. CODE § 123
(West 1956) (showing lack of true class-closing cases).
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either (b) or (c). Of particular utility is still another possibility: giving the
concerned child or sibling (i.e., the source) a power to appoint, terminate,
or otherwise direct distributions, so that the grandchildren or nieces and
nephews can take whenever the power holder believes it safe for them to do
SO.' 09 This may better fix the responsibility than vesting such responsibility
in a fiduciary or relying on arbitrary ages or periods. This would especially
be true whenever the parent/power-holder could be expected to have the
financial capacity to adjust for deficiencies in foresight.
B. Implied Conditions of Survivorship
The survival questions discussed here do not involve the doctrine of
lapse (i.e., death before a testator),"' nor are they affected by typical anti-
lapse statutes."' These questions are concerned with whether a particular
remainder beneficiary, often a child or other descendant of the transferor, is
required to survive beyond the testator's death (or other effective date of
transfer inter vivos) to the later time of distribution.
The nature and extent of courts' reluctance to find these implied sur-
vival requirements in most forms of future interest disposition have become
increasingly clear over the years." 2 The actual results of modern cases tend
to fall into sensible and surprisingly coherent patterns, if we look at out-
comes rather than dicta. Nevertheless, the amount of unnecessary, costly
family controversy and the difficulties courts and litigants have in handling
these cases continue to reflect an unfortunate combination of confused anal-
ysis and verbiage." 3 More importantly, they reflect the lack of a sound,
clear theory for decisions in this vital area of constructional problems.
The foregoing generalizations are essentially valid with respect to the
situation or trend in most states throughout the country, although certainly
the stage of development or degree of clarity varies rather widely and a few
109. Even if the purpose of a trust that bypasses the well-to-do son or daughter is
to skip a generation entirely for transfer tax purposes, this type of power in a child
can be designed to conform to the special exception in the generation-skipping
transfer tax for powers exercisable only in favor of the grantor's lineal descendants
who are all members of generations younger than that of the power holder. See
I.R.C. § 2613(e)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
110. See generally 6 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 3, § 50.2; see also id
§§ 50.21 ("void" bequests), 35.15 (lapse and class gifts).
11. See id §§ 50.10 (anti-lapse statutes generally), 35.17 (applicability to class
gifts). But compare ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 1101 , § 4-11 (Smith-Hurd 1978); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(2) (Purdon 1975).
112. Clearly, much of this has been attributable to the work and persuasive
force of the American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 249-262,
296(2) (1940).
113. An extensive analysis of the case law, with its variations, complexities, and
confusion can be found in 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, §§ 146, 575-594
(survivorship generally); id §§ 652-659 (survival in class gifts).
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distinctly exceptional situations exist.114 The quick overview of the doc-
trine that follows is intended merely to provide a brief summary of general
American case law and a framework for understanding and explaining the
present state of that law.
Remainder to named individual In A's trust for B for life, remainder to C,
C's interest is subject to no implied condition of survivorship. If she prede-
ceases B, her remainder interest is an asset of her estate, like any other prop-
erty, and passes by will or intestacy to her successors in interest. " 5
Remainders to multiple named benefiaries. The same would generally be
true of C's share of the remainder in A's trust to B for life, remainder to C,
D, and E. 116 Here we find a few errant decisions and quite a bit of dicta
suggesting fine distinctions based on details of wording and circumstance,
but subsequent decisions, especially the modern cases, almost inevitably de-
velop exceptions or discover intentions that prevent the supposed verbal
distinctions from having much influence on the outcome of cases one way or
another. 17 A classic in the broad words of futurity category is the leading
114. See generaly Halbach, Future Interests.- Express and Implied Conditions of Survival
(pts. I & 2), 49 CALIF. L. Rgv. 297, 431 (1961). Exceptional rules have been created
by statute in Illinois and Pennsylvania. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 1102, § 4-11
(Smith-Hurd 1978); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(2) (Purdon 1975); Waggoner,
Future Interests Legislation: Implied Conditions of Survivorship and Substitutionay Cifs
Under the New Illinois 'Anti-Lapse" Provision, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 423. A unique com-
mon law view, the "Tennessee class doctrine," and subsequent legislation, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-305 (1977), which has (even if it probably should not have) con-
founded the local courts, are discussed in Comment, Has Tennessee Abolished its An-
cient Class Doctrine or Only Modified It?, 7 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REv. 129 (1976).
115. This, in fact, is the classic example of an indefeasibly vested remainder. See,
e.g., Bochte v. Chess, 124 Cal. App. 2d 321, 268 P.2d 493 (1954). This is so despite
the language of futurity. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank v. Baumann, 108 II1. App.
3d 322, 326, 438 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (1982).
116. See, e.g., In re Estate of Martin, 110 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (words of futurity are important as revealing intention).
117. See, e.g., Redman v. Ring, 94 N.H. 195, 49 A.2d 921 (1946) (flat rejection of
suggestion that words of futurity are important or revealing of intention). A broad
exception, however, has been more appealing to some courts:
[I]f such payment or distribution is not deferred for reasons personal to the
legatee, but merely because the testator desired to appropriate the subject
matter. . . to use and benefit of another for. . . life. . . , the vesting
of the gift in remainder will not be postponed, . . . the right of enjoy-
ment only being deferred.
Knight v. Pottieser, 176 Ill. 368, 374, 52 N.E. 934, 935 (1898). And where that type
of explanation for the deferral is not available, another way out can be found, either
(1) because the postponed beneficiaries themselves were entitled to the income in
the meantime, as in In re Fouks' Will, 206 Wis. 69, 238 N.W. 869 (1931), or (2)
[Vol. 48
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case on divide-and-payover language, Matter of Crane.'18 This case concedes
that, if a future interest distribution is postponed "for the purpose of letting
in an intermediate estate," the supposed presumption favoring an implied
survival requirement based on divide-and-payover wording is rebutted and
"the interest should be deemed vested."" 9 (The court's misuse of the term
"vested," as if it were synonymous with "free from an implied condition of
survivorship," is consistent with the long tradition of confused dicta in this
area.) In all these cases, it would be about as foolish to believe that words of
futurity are in some Freudian way revealing of transferor intentions as it
would be to believe that the divide-and-payover rule or others like it 120 are
anywhere a meaningful guide to decisions.
Remainders in gifl form: "children" and other single-generation classes. As we
move next to the situation involving, in essence, a trust for the benefit of S
for life, remainder to S's children, we still find that there is generally no
implied survival requirement attached to the future interests of the chil-
dren, despite the class gift form of the remainder.' 2 ' In this type of case,
more than in the previous situations, we do find decisions reaching contrary
results. 122 We also find widespread contrary dicta that at least reads as if it
is to be taken seriously, although these suggestions of implied conditions are
usually found (sometimes only by strong inference) in cases purporting to
distinguish the situation actually before the court from class gift situations.
This is typified by opinions in which the court, finding no implied condition
attached to a particular limitation, stresses that the remainder beneficiaries
were named "as individuals" and "were not made members of a class,"
123
because the income was available to the deferred beneficiaries in the trustee's discre-
tion in the meantime, as in Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9 S.E.2d 420 (1940).
118. 164 N.Y. 71, 58 N.E. 47 (1900).
119. Id at 76, 58 N.E. at 49.
120. Such as the notorious rule in Clobberie's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 476 (Ch.
1677), which has evolved into often-recognized distinctions between bequests to
someone "at" or "when he reaches" a stated age (supposedly implying a survival
condition, but one which is easily rebutted) and bequests "to be paid" or "payable
at" some age (no condition to be implied). See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 21.17, .18 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
121. See, e.g., Privett v. Jones, 251 N.C. 386, 111 S.E.2d 533 (1959); see also 5
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 25.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 1, §§ 146, 654.
122. See discussion in 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, §§ 571-610. The
only clear and persistent line of such decisions is represented by the Tennessee class
doctrine, which continues in its original form as to pre-1927 instruments but the
effect of which apparently has been modified (despite continuing confusion) by legis-
lation with respect to post-1927 dispositions. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-305
(1977); Comment, supra note 114. Compare ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110 /, § 4-11
(Smith-Hurd 1978), with Waggoner, supra note 114.
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or that they were "named as individuals, not as a class" and therefore were
not subject to the "'roll call" principle.' 24 It was against a background of
local dicta of that general character that one leading case, In re Estate of
Stanford,125 brought some clarity out of confusion and finally established in
California "that the mere fact that takers of a postponed gift are described
by a class designation" does not give rise to an implied condition of sur-
vival.1 26 The opinion also pointed out that remainders of the type before
the court were vested, and the mere fact that each member's interest could
be partially divested to admit afterborn members of the class "would not
indicate that the remainders were contingent." 1 27 What inference is to be
drawn from these concluding words? That question brings us to the next
step in this progression through the survivorship cases.
Efject of conditions unrelated to survival. Assume now that X devises to Y
for life, remainder to Y's issue, but "if Y dies without issue, then to Z."
Even here it is unlikely that Z's interest will be found to be subject to an
implied requirement of survivorship. A growing majority of courts recog-
nize, quite properly, that a future interest is not subject to an implied condi-
tion of survival merely because it is subject to some other condition
precedent that makes the interest contingent.128 If the other condition is in
the form of a condition subsequent, so that the interest can be characterized
as vested, courts have had little or no difficulty recognizing that no survival
requirement is to be implied.'2 9 Where that other condition is precedent and
thus the interest contingent, however, we do find a number of cases reach-
ing a contrary result' 30 and an even greater amount of dicta from other
types of cases having to be disregarded in order to avoid implying a condi-
tion of survivorship. 3 ' Thus, the quotation from Stanford toward the end of
124. Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 722, 9 S.E.2d 420, 425 (1940).
125. 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957).
126. Id at 126, 315 P.2d at 684.
127. Id at 129, 315 P.2d at 685.
128. See, e.g. ,In re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 783, 361 P.2d 900, 13 Cal. Rptr. 180
(1961); In re Bogart's Will, 62 Misc. 2d 114, 308 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sur. Ct. 1970);
Daniel v. Donahue, 215 Or. 373, 333 P.2d 1109 (1959); In re Dickson's Estate, 396
Pa. 371, 152 A.2d 680 (1959). For examples of sound results but confused reasoning
or terminology, see Hays v. Cole, 221 Miss. 459, 73 So. 2d 258 (1954); In re Patter-
son's Estate, 247 Pa. 529, 93 A. 608 (1915).
129. See, e.g., Randall v. Bank of America, 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 119 P.2d 754
(1941) (involving remainders subject to powers of revocation); First Nat'l Bank of
Cincinnati v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956) (same).
130. See, e.g., Davis v. McKown, 131 Me. 203, 160 A. 458 (1932). The most
notorious decision of this variety, In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich, 208, 234 N.W. 141
(1931), was promptly overturned by 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 21 l, codifjedat MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.101 (West 1967). Cf Spence v. Second Nat'l Bank, 126
Ind. App. 125, 130 N.E.2d 667 (1955) (alternative limitation to "children").
131. See text accompanying notes 132 & 136 infia; see also First Nat'l Bank of
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the preceding paragraph influenced an intermediate appellate court in Cal-
ifornia to come to the rather extraordinary conclusion that Z's interest was
vested, subject to being divested should Y die leaving issue; the court felt
liberated to find that there was no implied condition of survivorship.1
3 2
The California Supreme Court reviewed the decision and also concluded
that the interest was free from an implied survival requirement, but it fur-
ther recognized that whether an interest is technically vested or contingent
and whether it is an executory interest or an alternative contingent remain-
der are in reality false issues and irrelevant.13 Other cases similarly have
refused to imply conditions of survival in comparable situations, despite the
added element that the contingent interest in question was not to a named
individual (like Z, above) but was to a class.' 34 Missouri's Taply v. Dill,"3 5
decided in 1949, has served as a leading case in this general area, observing
that other cases that "have considered contingent remainders [to be] subject
to an implied condition of the donee surviving the particular estate al-
though not [expressly] so conditioned, seemingly because subject to a condi-
tion precedent," simply are "not logically sound." 
13 6
Multi-generational classes: "issue" and "descendants." A true shift in treat-
ment and prevailing doctrine finally appears when we come to W's trust for
H for life, remainder to W's issue, or when we encounter A's devise to B for
life, remainder "to the descendants of C." In these situations, a condition of
survivorship is implied from the very use of the term "issue" or "descend-
ants." The result is supported not only by the weight of modem case au-
thority' but also by the Restatement of Property and other major
treatises. 138
Cincinnati v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 519, 138 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1956) (question
before court stated to be whether deceased beneficiary had "contingent remainder"
which would be "conditioned upon her survival" or whether she had "vested re-
mainder subject to [being] divested').
132. In re Estate of Ferry, 8 Adv. Cal. Rptr. 585 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (opinion
withdrawn upon grant of hearing by California Supreme Court).
133. In re Estate of Ferry, 55 Cal. 2d 783, 785, 361 P.2d 900, 902, 13 Cal. Rptr.
180, 182 (1961).
134. See, e.g., In re Bogart's Will, 62 Misc. 2d 114, 308 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sur. Ct.
1970); Daniel v. Donahue, 215 Or. 373, 333 P.2d 1109 (1959);In re Dickson's Estate,
396 Pa. 371, 152 A.2d 680 (1959).
135. 358 Mo. 824, 217 S.W.2d 369 (1949).
136. Id. at 830, 217 S.W.2d at 373.
137. See, e.g., Twaites v. Waller, 133 Iowa 84, 110 N.W. 279 (1907); Altman v.
Rider, 291 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956). An interesting case, recognizing this as
a general rule but reaching the opposite result (i.e., no implied survivorship require-
ment) to avoid violation of the rule against perpetuities, is Second Bank-State Street
Trust Co. v. Second Bank-State Street Trust Co., 335 Mass. 407, 140 N.E.2d 201
(1957).
138. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 295 comment g (1940); 2A R. POWELL
1983]
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If judicial reasoning fails to explain and help predict the results of
cases, and in fact often tends to be misleading, what does justify and explain
what is going on in the survivorship cases? Until we reached the cases in-
volving issue and descendants, we found, despite some false starts, a wide-
spread and increasingly clear reluctance on the part of the courts to imply
conditions of survivorship. Yet it is virtually a matter of gospel among
those skilled in estate planning and in the drafting of wills and trusts that
remainder beneficiaries should be expressly required to survive until the
time of distribution, in order to avoid a premature risk of property being
diverted outside of the family or bloodlines, unwarranted administration
and tracing difficulties, and unnecessary estate and inheritance taxation. 1
3 9
If this is so, why should courts not impoy such conditions where drafting
failures have caused them to be omitted? The answer is surprisingly simple.
The various considerations that favor requiring survival until the time
of distribution are opposed by a single overriding concern in most types of
survivorship cases: the possibility of inadvertently excluding a line of de-
scent or of wholly omitting provision for the family of a beneficiary by rea-
son of a fortuitous order of deaths, especially when this result patently
conflicts with applicable policies and probable intent. The presence of this
concern makes it undesirable for a court to imply a condition of survival,
and the absence of this concern frees a court to respond to the other consid-
erations by finding that survival is required.
Thus, in holdings throughout the survivorship area, a distinction tends
to be drawn, and should be drawn, between (a) gifts to what might be
called inflexible or single-generation classes (typified by "children," "broth-
ers and sisters," "nieces and nephews," and "grandchildren") and (b) gifts
to flexible, multi-generational classes (e.g., "issue,". "descendants," "heirs of
the body," and the like; the terms "heirs," "next of kin," and the like are
potentially similar but also involve considerations outside the present dis-
cussion)."4 However much courts may stumble around in confused verbi-
age and property law technicalities, as we have seen, the simple fact is that
courts generally refuse to imply conditions of survivorship in cases of inflexi-
ble or single-generation classes. We have also seen that the actual results
are little affected by other details of wording or context. In flexible, multi-
generational cases, we imply the survival requirement from the class terms
"issue" and "descendants" themselves, primarily because it is now safe to do
so, thereby responding to the other considerations that favor that result.
The results can possibly also be rationalized on the ground that the terms
& P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY 327 (rev. ed. 1981); 2 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra
note 1, § 146.
139. On the difficulties of tracing transmissible interests that have been omitted
from inventories and decrees, see In re Latimer's Will, 266 Wis. 158, 63 N.W.2d 65
(1954). On death taxation, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(1); see also Coddington v.
Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9 S.E.2d 420 (1940).
140. See Halbach, supra note 114, at 315-20.
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used are ones that not only provide for but seem to contemplate the substi-
tution of more remote generations for the missing members of nearer
generations.1
4 1
Given the limited alternatives that American courts recognize to be
available in construing ambiguous or uncertain language in wills and trusts,
and given the courts' associated unwillingness to "write" or "rewrite" wills
and trusts,142 the adaptability of the class becomes controlling virtually
without regard to other incidental features of the case. If there is a remain-
der to the transferor's children or grandchildren and one of those class
members dies before the date the interest comes into enjoyment, it is better
to accept the various costs and risks involved in having that interest pass
through the deceased member's estate than it would be to accept that his or
her share passes to the surviving class members. The latter construction
would leave nothing for the family that is likely to be left by the deceased
class member,' 43 who, quite fortuitously, may have died shortly before
rather than shortly after the time of distribution.
C. Express Conditions of Survivorship
A related issue is presented by express conditions of survivorship that
fail to make clear the time to which the condition relates. These problems
arise in a variety of specific contexts,'" but they are adequately illustrated
byH's bequest in trust for W for life, remainder "to my surviving children."
A clear majority of jurisdictions hold that the children must survive W for
141. See Altman v. Rider, 291 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 295 comment g (1940).
142. American courts merely allow a choice between the limited alternatives the
language will bear; they will not supply a substitute disposition. For example, in
survivorship cases involving single-generation classes, either the deceased class
member's interest fails and goes to the surviving class members or the member's
interest passes through his estate-possibly to outsiders-without regard to his fam-
ily status and the terms of his will. A court will not supply a substitute gift to the
issue of the deceased class member.
Some significant recent statutes, however, introduce new possibilities by pro-
viding for substitute dispositions to issue who are not mentioned in the instrument,
allowing them to take in place of a remainder beneficiary whom the statute requires
to survive to the time of possession. Anti-lapse legislation is extended by ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 110'/2, § 4-11 (Smith-Hurd 1978); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114(2)
(Purdon 1975). Cf TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-305 (1977) ("cure" for Tennessee class
doctrine).
143. For the influence of this concern, see Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 9
S.E.2d 420 (1940); text accompanying note 152 infra.
144. For example, consider cases involving alternative or supplanting limita-
tions, such as "to B or her descendants," or "to the children of X and the issue of
any deceased child." To what time does the survival requirement called for by the
word "or" (or by the "deceased" reference) relate? See Halbach, supra note 114, at
447-51. Cf id. at 323-27.
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their remainder interests to take effect, 145 but a minority view would re-
quire the children merely to survive H. 14' That is, the prevailing view
would read the language as if it meant "to those of my children who survive
W," while the minority would read it as "to those of my children who sur-
vive me."
The first of these positions is believed to give H's words their natural
meaning, 147 whereas the latter has been said to represent an excessive ad-
herence to the law's supposed preference for early vesting. 14' This criticism,
however, is too unsympathetic, for the real concern again is almost certainly
the risk of inadvertent disinheritance of a line of descent-the same concern
that we earlier saw prevents our implying a condition of survivorship in the
case of a future interest to a class of children. Yet it is hard to quarrel with
the majority's perception of the natural import of the language, whether
from the viewpoint of the reader, the scrivener, or the transferor. Appar-
ently, the courts' real doubt here, and a legitimate concern, is whether H in
our example and other similarly situated transferors, or their lawyers, actu-
ally thought through the implications of the language in the event a child
should die leaving issue and really intended the result that the majority
construction would likely produce in actual application.
1 49
Nevertheless, a full analysis of the considerations involved may well
suggest that the majority view is preferable. 50 For example, after many
years of uncertainty and conflicting decisions in New York, this is what was
ultimately concluded in In re Gautier's Will.15
The moral for private drafting purposes is no doubt too obvious to
belabor. For present purposes, however, the important point to recognize is
that one can again readily see in this body of litigation the basic considera-
tions that run through survivorship issues generally, in addition to seeing
the tensions and doubts that exist in applying to real family situations the
majority rule on the ambiguously expressed condition of survival. The rea-
sons why, and the ways in which, judges might seek avenues of escape from
this rule also can be seen in a particularly interesting case involving a
145. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 251 (1940); 5 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 21.15 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1,
§ 577. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 122 (West 1956) (statutory rule to same effect).
146. See, e.g., Alsman v. Waiters, 184 Ind. 565, 111 N.E. 921 (1916).
147. See In re Gautier's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 502, 146 N.E.2d 771, 207 N.Y.S.2d 123
(1957); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 251 comment a (1940).
148. 2A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY 328 (rev. ed. 1981).
149. See In re Nass's Estate, 320 Pa. 380, 182 A. 401 (1936) (emphasizing distor-
tion and improbable intention of having whole estate pass to child who happened
to survive); text accompanying notes 152-53 injra.
150. See Halbach, supra note 114, at 442-45.
151. 3 N.Y.2d 502, 506, 146 N.E.2d 771, 773, 207 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126 (1957). But
cf. In re Mulholland's Will, 105 Misc. 2d 354, 356, 432 N.Y.S.2d 76, 80 (Sur. Ct.
1980) (no "ambiguity or lack of clarity" concerning testator's intention that would
justify "application of rules of construction").
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closely related instance of suspected neglect or drafting oversight. In In re
Welles' Will,'5 2 the minority, in a 4-3 decision, would have interpreted an
explicit remainder to "grandchildren then living" as including great-
grandchildren. The dissenting judges were satisfied that they could find no
"intention to discriminate among the grandchildren or their families," and
that the testator would not have intended "that two of the five branches of
[his] direct descendants should be disinherited simply because the heads of
those two branches failed to outlive" the life beneficiary. 53
V. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Despite a possibly increasing awareness of all of these matters by law-
yers in drafting private instruments, and despite progress in some of these
areas through legislation or judicial decision, a significant array of recurring
issues involving the rights of children and other descendants to take under
class gifts remain very much with us. As we have seen, these problems arise
in several general categories of important cases.
First, modernization of intestacy statutes has been accompanied by
only limited progress in handling vital definitional problems of class gifts.
Even where presumptions concerning adoptees now reflect current family
attitudes and probabilities of intent generally, they are not finely tuned to
the importance of de facto relationships. Furthermore, decisions have only
begun to evolve principles for dealing with adoption out issues. The varied
class gift problems involving persons born out of wedlock have also just
begun to be explored. Again, de facto relationships of parent to child and
within the broader family should be emphasized, for this approach better
reflects probable intention than do the formal distinctions that may be rea-
sonably acceptable for intestacy situations and, in a general way, for the
estates of the natural parents themselves.
Second, the basic per capita/per stirpes problem of class gifts to issue is
now worked out reasonably well in nearly all states. Nevertheless, statutes
and precedents inadequately handle some traditional details, especially
when there are no living descendants of the first generation. In addition,
courts have not yet had to face up to some increasingly important problems
of discretionary trust distributions among issue.
Finally, rules applicable to fluctuating class membership have
progressed reasonably well in the last several decades, at least unless we are
prepared to venture into considerably more flexible, fundamentally non-
traditional approaches to these problems.' 4 Class-closing issues cause little
serious controversy today. Even the difficulties in the much litigated survi-
152. 9 N.Y.2d 277, 173 N.E.2d 876, 213 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1961).
153. Id at 285, 173 N.E.2d at 880-81, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 445-46 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
154. See note 142 supra on presumptions requiring survival and substituting the
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vorship cases are a result mainly of unclear and sometimes confused analy-
ses, but with a redeeming tendency to fumble through false issues to accept-
able results--often on a seemingly intuitive or visceral basis. It should be
promising, however, that a clear and simple principle can readily be identi-
fied to explain and guide decisions in this latter area: the danger of inad-
vertently disinheriting lines of descendants makes implied conditions of
survival inappropriate to inflexible, single-generation class gifts. But sur-
vival requirements can and should be implied when the transferor has used
multi-generation terms that provide adaptability for these contingencies.
The present state of the law and the diverse issues presented by varied
dispositions to a person's descendants impose significant obligations upon
lawyers in their interviewing and in the drafting of wills and trusts. Instru-
ments should contain clauses expressly defining; (a) the extent to which
class terms include persons born out of wedlock and persons adopted into or
out of the class, bearing in mind that most of the troublesome questions
require the planner to anticipate future events that cannot be known to the
client and involve situations in which the transferor is not the natural or
adoptive parent; and (b) the manner in which distribution is to be made
among issue or descendants, recognizing that even the terms "per stirpes"
and "by right of representation" may be ambiguous or possibly even inap-
propriate whenever a generation of descendants is entirely removed. In ad-
dition, proper drafting of future interests almost always requires clear
language (a) calling for distribution (or appointment) among persons who
are alive when the time of possession arrives and (b) describing remainder
beneficiaries (or permissible appointees) in terms that are flexible enough to
adapt to the deaths of potential recipients.
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